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Sovereign default is a paradox in and of itself. This is primarily
because of the undeniable State power over creditors, but also because
creditors would need to overcome a State’s sovereignty to secure their
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rights. 1 Prior to the Second World War, so long as creditors were not
nationals of the defaulting State and their national State was willing to
pursue or force the return of investments through diplomatic or military
means, creditors would rely on diplomatic protection by their nation
State to secure their rights. 2 Indicatively, the Drago Porter Convention
of 1907 provided States should first attempt to peacefully arbitrate
claims arising from sovereign indemnity before resorting to military
means. 3 If creditors’ national States were unwilling or unable to assist
in the creditors’ claims, lenders were left without recourse, other than
negotiating an acceptable settlement by trying to assert pressure on the
State through the threat of denial of future lending. 4
Resorting to litigation was not an option available for creditors
because States enjoyed absolute immunity from suits in national
courts. 5 This essentially rendered it impossible for a creditor to find a
venue to pursue his claims, outside of the defaulting State’s courts. 6
Using the defaulting State’s courts provided little comfort to creditors. 7
However, following 1945, several studies suggest creditors began to
shift away from this approach, and more sovereign default cases were
brought before national courts. 8 This is partially because it became
common practice for States to waive, in advance, their right to claim
immunity from jurisdiction in the terms of issuance. 9 Additionally,
developments in international law widely recognized challenges against
States in national courts. 10 That stated, the issue of enforcement of a
foreign judgment against a State is still a thorny issue and,
1. KENNETH H.F. DYSON, STATES DEBT & POWER: ‘SAINTS’ & ‘SINNERS’ IN
EUROPEAN HISTORY & INTEGRATION 240 (2014).
2. MAX WINKLER, FOREIGN BONDS: AN AUTOPSY 146 (1999).
3. DYSON, supra note 1, at 240.
4. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 67, 68 (2014).
5. Id.; see also NORBERT GAILLARD, WHEN SOVEREIGNS GO BANKRUPT: A
STUDY ON SOVEREIGN RISK 13 (2014).
6. Weidemaier, supra note 4, at 68.
7. Id.
8. See Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch, & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign
Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976 – 2010, 2 (Feb. 13, 2013)
(working paper) (on file with SSRN Electronic Journal).
9. Weidemaier, supra note 4, at 69.
10. See, e.g., Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
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unsurprisingly, it is a long-standing belief in international
macroeconomics that sovereign debt cannot be enforced. 11
Hence, claiming and enforcing investors’ rights against sovereign
states is not an easy task. Indeed, unlike insolvency of other entities,
there isn’t any uniform legal framework regulating insolvency of
sovereign States. Therefore, there is a regulatory vacuum not only in
relation to substantive law, but also on enforcement.
This Article will address investors’ rights in case of sovereign
default from a contractual perspective and examine whether the legal
framework available for breach of contract suffices to provide an
efficient and complete framework for the satisfaction of investors’
claims in case of sovereign default. This Article will primarily focus
on the Greek bonds’ restructuring of 2012, but will draw wider
conclusions for bondholders’ protection.
First, the Article examines the legal nature of sovereign bonds.
Second, it reviews the applicable laws including: national law as it
applies to state contracts, international law, choice of law, and lex fori.
Third, it covers the basic contractual clauses including: “pari passu,”
collective action clauses, events of default clauses, other clauses, and
waiver of immunity, while examining the development of these
contractual terms in an attempt to better safeguard bondholders’ rights.
I. THE LEGAL NATURE OF SOVEREIGN BONDS
The legal nature of sovereign bonds can be difficult to define.
Bonds can be understood in a number of ways, including as
investments, capital rising tools, financial instruments, and on balancesheet debt security. 12 Additionally, sovereign bonds can take several
forms, including inter alia, conventional bonds, convertible bonds,
zero-coupon bonds, and floating rate notes. 13 To better evaluate
sovereign bonds’ legal nature, it is best to review how these bonds are
issued, and the modus by which, they are offered to the public.

11. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, The Aftermath of Financial
Crises, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 466, 466−72 (2009).
12. STEFAN WEBER, THE LAW APPLICABLE TO BONDS 29 (Hans van Houte et
al. eds., 1999).
13. For an analysis of the features of each bond instrument see MOORAD
CHOUDHRY, HANDBOOK OF FINANCE 276−78 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 2008).
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Generally, the legal framework regulating the issuance of bonds is
different in each State. 14 An international bond market exists, which
illustrates several similarities in the bond-issuance process set by such
frameworks. Specifically, within the Eurozone, the process followed
for the issuance of sovereign bonds by Member States is largely
similar. 15 Such process can be broken down in roughly three phases:
pre-issuance, issuance, and closing.
In the pre-issuance phase, following the legal documentation and
prospectus preparation for a new bond, the issuer selects a Lead
Manager, likely an investment bank, which undertakes to approach and
negotiate with prospective underwriters for the syndicate formation. 16
The involvement of a Lead Manager is necessary because States do not
have their own banking facilities. 17 At this stage, the Issuer would also
proceed to announce the new issue and would send formal invitations,
along with the preliminary Offering Circular and timetable, to
prospective underwriters to take part in the syndicate. 18 Normally, the
underwriters would be investment banks, commercial banks, or a
combination of institutional investors. 19 Following the announcement,
and in line with the timetable provided, the Lead Manager would liaise
with other underwriters to form a Managing Group. 20 Then, that
Managing Group would negotiate and finalize the issuance’s terms with
the issuer. 21 Next, the syndicate would need to accept or reject the
finalized issuance terms within approximately twenty-four hours. 22

14. See Hans-Joachim Dübel, Partial Sovereign Bond Insurance by the
Eurozone: A More Efficient Alternative to Blue (Euro-)bonds, 252 CTR. FOR EUR.
POL’Y STUD. 1, 3 (2011).
15. Id. at 2.
16. Although notably a large number of countries no longer use syndicates,
countries have been replaced syndicates with auctions. See G.J. Schinasi & R.T.
Smith, Fixed-Income Markets in the United States, Europe and Japan: Some Lessons
for Emerging Markets (IMF, Working Paper No. 98/173, 1998).
17. See EDWIN BORCHARD, STATE INSOLVENCY AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS:
GENERAL PRINCIPLE, VOL. 1, 45 (1951).
18. MOORAD CHOUDHRY, THE BOND & MONEY MARKETS: STRATEGY,
TRADING, ANALYSIS 386–87 (2001).
19. Id. at 383.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 386–87.
22. Id.
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The issuance stage follows. If the terms are accepted, the Syndicate
will enter into a Subscription Agreement with the Issuer, which
contains all the details pertaining to the issuance. 23 Once the
Subscription Agreement is entered into, the underwriting syndicate (i.e.
the syndicate members that agreed to underwrite the bonds offered at
the issuance) would “underwrite” the bonds by guaranteeing the Issuer
a payment of the previously agreed price for the shares. 24 The Lead
Manager would notify the underwriting syndicate members of their
allotments, and then the final Offering Circular would be distributed. 25
Following this, at the closing stage, members of the selling group
offer the bonds in the secondary market, which are usually sold over the
counter, 26 and the underwriting syndicate must pay the Issuer that
agreed amount. Hence, despite the legal framework’s complexity and
the many intermediaries that exist during the bond issuance process, we
can summarize that bonds are generally treated as loan contracts
between the issuer and the subscriber. 27 They are transferrable debt
securities issued to the initial subscribers. 28 Then the subscriber
acquires the bonds and provides medium or long-term financing to the
issuer in exchange for payment of the nominal amount plus interest
upon maturity. 29 This is confirmed by the language found in several
sovereign bonds when referring to the bonds’ status stipulating: “The
Notes constitute direct, unconditional, unsubordinated and unsecured
obligations of the Issuer.” 30

23. Id.
24. SHELAGH HEFFERNAN, MODERN BANKING 560 (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
eds., 2005).
25. CHOUDHRY, supra note 18, at 387.
26. See So Why do Bonds Trade OTC?, INT’L CAP. MKT. ASS’N.,
https://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/SecondaryMarkets/Bond-Market-Transparency-Wholesale-Retail/So-why-do-bonds-tradeOTC-/ (last visited May 22, 2018).
27. WEBER, supra note 12, at 29.
28. PHILIP R. WOOD, INTERNATIONAL LOANS, BONDS, GUARANTEES, LEGAL
OPINIONS 193 (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 2d ed. 2007).
29. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON’S FINANCE &
INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 12 (Barron’s Educational Series, 7th ed. 2003).
30. See, e.g., THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC, Greek Offering Circular (Apr. 10,
2014),
https://ftalphaville-cdn.ft.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Greece-FinalOffering-Circular-dated-10-April-2014.pdf.
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For this Article’s purposes, the closing stage is the only relevant
stage, as this is the time sovereign bonds are granted to investors.
Sovereign bonds are usually issued to investors by virtue of the
following legal documents: (1) a fiscal agency agreement or trust
agreement, (2) a contract that entails the terms and conditions
applicable to the bonds; (3) a prospectus disclosing the necessary
information under applicable legislation in relation to the bonds’ issue,
as well the issuer and the country itself; and (4) a registration
statement. 31
Therefore, the relationship between the issuer and bondholder is
contractual. Hence, we will particularly examine the law applicable to
State contracts and sovereign bonds to explore bondholders’ rights
under such contracts. Applicable law is of the utmost importance to
determine investors’ rights in case of sovereign default. 32 International
investment law regulates both substantive and procedural issues and, as
will be demonstrated, can be a powerful weapon either in the State or
investor’s hands. For these reasons, it is one of the “most sensitive legal
issues.” 33
II. APPLICABLE LAW
To determine applicable law governing the relation between the
State and the investor(s), we must first explore how this relation was
created. Specifically, we must consider the legal basis for the relation.
As already stipulated, for bond issuances cases, the underlying
relationship between investors and the issuing State stems from
sovereign bond contracts.

31. Catalin Stefanescu, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign
Bond Contracts and Their Effect on Spreads at Issuance, EUR. FIN. MGMT. ASSOC. 1,
10 (2016), http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%
20MEETINGS/2016-Switzerland/papers/EFMA2016_0442_fullpaper.pdf.
32. See Committee on Foreign & Comparative Law, Governing Law in
Sovereign Debt – Lessons from the Greek Crisis and Argentina Dispute of 2012, 1
N.Y.C. BAR (Feb. 2013), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072390GoverningLawinSovereignDebt.pdf.
33. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 81 (2d ed. 2008).
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The legal treatment of State contracts has been extensively
discussed. 34
Although opposite views have been expressed, 35
generally, State contracts are treated differently than ordinary
commercial contracts between non-state entities. 36 These differences
exist because strong public policy considerations are usually applied in
State contracts, and a State differs from any other contractual party due
to its exorbitant powers. 37 These considerations are often interpreted in
the application of public law, specifically, administrative law; 38 and the
exercise of a State’s discretion on the negotiation, conclusion,
operation, and termination of such contracts. 39 Although different
States may regulate State contracts differently within their national law,
the distinction between ordinary commercial contracts between private
parties and State contracts are nonetheless recognized universally in
several national legal systems. 40
Hence, the question of which law applies to such contracts is one
that raises questions amongst scholars and arbitral tribunals, with
various theories coming forward. According to such theories, we can
distinguish between the following laws that can apply to State contracts:
national law, international law, the law chosen by the parties, and lex
fori.

34. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, State Contracts, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/11
(2004).
35. See, e.g., PHILIP R. WOOD, CONFLICT OF LAWS & INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
60 (2007) (where it is stipulated that “there are no special rules applying to State
commercial contracts”).
36. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 34, at 5.
37. Patrick R. Wautelet, International Public Contracts: Applicable Law and
Dispute Resolution, U. LIÈGE (2015), https://orbi.uliege.be/bitstream/2268/136404/
1/Wautelet%20-%20Applicable%20Law%20(final).pdf.
38. Charles Leben, La théorie du contratd’etat et l’évolution du droit
international des investissements 302 Le RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE [R.C.A.D.I.] 197 (2003) (Fr.).
39. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 34, at 5.
40. Id.; see also COLIN TURPIN, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (1972). But see
WOOD, supra note 35 (arguing State contracts entered into between a sovereign
government and non-state entity, should not be treated fundamentally differently than
private contracts).
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A. National Law as Applicable to State Contracts
Several scholars support the application of national law in State
contracts, absent a “choice of law provision” to the contrary. 41 This
opinion was reinstated by the Permanent Court of International Justice
in its early case concerning The Payment of Various Serbian Loans
Issued in France, where the Court ruled: 42
Any contract which is not a contract between States in their capacity
as subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of some
country. The question as to which this law is forms the subject of that
branch of law which is at the present day usually described as private
international law or the doctrine of the conflict of laws. 43

Accordingly, the law applicable to State contracts would be the State
host’s law. 44
There are various reasons to support such a claim. According to
the gravity test, a contract is governed by the law, which the contract is
most closely connected to. 45 For example, in a sovereign bond
agreement, the issuer’s country is most likely the place where: the
bonds will be issued, the agreement will be signed and delivered, the
funds will be remitted to, and where they will be repaid. 46 Hence, the
issuing State’s law should also be applicable. 47 Additionally, a
41. See F.V. Garcia Amador, Fourth Rep. on State Responsibility, U.N. DOC.
A/CN.4/119, at 126 (1959); F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 302
(Oxford U. Press eds., 1973).
42. Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France
(Fr. v. Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 20, at 41 (July 12).
43. Id.
44. HEGE ELISBETH KJOS, APPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION:
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 172 (Vaughan Lowe
QC eds., 2013); see also GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 73–79
(Stevens eds., 1957) (discussing the conflict of laws criteria used by international
Courts and Tribunals).
45. OLIVER J. ARMAS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN
NEW YORK 91 (James H. Carter & John Fellas eds., 2d ed. 2013).
46. Davidson Sommers et al., Conflict Avoidance in International Loan and
Monetary Agreements, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 466 (1956).
47. TONY COLE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE SOURCES OF
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 223 (Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De Brabandere eds., 2012).
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sovereign bond agreement is very closely related to the State’s financial
interests. 48 Furthermore, applying the law of the issuing State is in line
with the notion of sovereignty. 49 In fact, the Committee established by
the League of Nations to study international law contracts concluded:
“every contract which is not an international agreement—i.e. a treaty
between States—is subject (as matters now stand) to municipal law.”50
In these cases, the law of the nation governs State contracts. 51
This is not only supported by the International Law Commission’s
Articles on State Responsibility, but also by tribunals’ case law. 52
Indicatively, in F. Wintershall A.G. v. Qatar, 53 the Tribunal applied the
gravity test and ruled that the law of Qatar was applicable. 54
Additionally, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (“ICSID”) reached the same conclusion in Société Ouest
Africaine des Bétons Industriels v. Senegal, where the Tribunal
considered that the law applicable “in respect of a project that was to
take place in Senegal, can only be Senegalese law.” 55 Notably, the
ICSID Convention particularly regulates this matter in Article 42(1). 56
Article 41(1) provides, in the absence of a choice of law clause in the
State Contract, the Tribunal will apply the “law of the Contracting State
Party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such
rules of international law as may be applicable.” 57 In fact, in Noble
48. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Alsing Case, 8 INT’L & COMP. Q. 320, 324–
29 (where despite Greece’s argument that Greek law should apply to the loan
agreement, the tribunal ruled in favor of the application of the law of the tribunal’s
seat, as indirectly chosen by the parties along with the seat of the tribunal). But see
T.W. Wälde, The Serbian Loans Case – A Precedent for Investment Treaty Protection
of Foreign Debt?, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 4 (2004).
49. KJOS, supra note 44, at 172.
50. Report of the Comm. for the Study of International Loan Contracts, League
of Nations Doc. II.A (1939).
51. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 34, at 5.
52. KJOS, supra note 44, at 173.
53. F. Wintershall et al., v. A.G. v. Qatar, Partial Award of 5 February 1988 and
Final Award of 31 May 1988, I.L.M. 795 (1989) (discussing a claim for expropriation
of contractual rights by the Government of Qatar due to an alleged termination of an
Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Ventures Inc. v. Romania, the ICSID Tribunal explicitly stated there is
a distinction between national law and international law, 58 while in SeaLand Service, Inc. v. Islamic Republic, the Tribunal applied Islamic law
as the relevant law. 59
Currently, the majority of sovereign bonds in Member States in the
Eurozone are governed by the national law of their respective state as
part of a choice of law clause. 60 The graph below illustrates this: 61

58. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1, Award, ¶ 53
(Oct. 12, 2005).
59. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. The Gov’t of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ports
and Shipping Org., Award No. 135/33/1 (June 22, 1984). But see Anaconda-Iran, Inc.
v. Iran and NICIC, Award No. 65/167/3 (Dec. 10, 1986) (where the ICSID Tribunal
found that in the absence of a choice of law clause it could be inferred that that the
parties had explicitly refuted the other party’s national law).
60. Ignacio Tirado, Current EU Mechanisms to Confront Sovereign Insolvency,
in SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE UNCTAD PRINCIPLES ON
RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING 317 (C.Espósito, Y. Li & Juan
P. Bohoslavsky eds., 2013).
61. Udaibir S. Das et al., Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Concepts,
Literature Survey, and Stylized Facts, 42 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
12/203, 2012).
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It must be stated that in cases of sovereign bonds, applying the
national law of the Debtor State can be highly prejudicial for investors’
rights, as the State will maintain the legislative power to amend the law
and frustrate investors’ rights. 62 This is what happened to the Greek
Sovereign Bond Exchange. On February 23, 2012, just days before the
Exchange, Greece enacted the Greek Bondholders’ Law, No.
4050/2012, which partially amended the terms of Greek sovereign
bonds issued prior to December 31, 2011, by introducing Collective
Action Clauses (“CACs”). 63 These clauses allowed a two-thirds
majority of the total number of Greek bondholders to bind all other
bondholders with their decisions, and not allow individual investors to
act solely by accelerating the bond or initiating litigation in the event of
default. 64
B. International Law as Applicable
The internalization of State contracts is another theory that has
recently gained some traction. Under this theory, international law
automatically overrides State contracts, regardless of the national law
provisions. 65 Hence, regardless of the typical application of national
law to a State contract, this cannot “entirely exclude the direct
applicability of international law in certain situations.” 66 Applying
international law to override applicable national law is an important
safeguard to investor’s rights. Otherwise, a State may simply adjust its
national law to benefit the State’s interests at the expense of the
investor’s rights.

62. MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER, SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING
LEGAL RISK (1984).
63. See Rules Relating to the Adjustment of Securities their Issue or Guarantee
by the Greek State with the Agreement of the Bondholders [Greek Bondholders’ Law]
art. 1, Feb. 23, 2012 [EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS]
[E.K.E.D.] A:36, Feb. 23, 2012 (Greece).
64. See Mitu Gulati & Lee C. Buchheit, How to Restructure Greek Debt, 9
(Duke
Law
Working
Paper,
Paper
No.
47,
2010),
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2336.
65. A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary International
Law; Monist versus Dualist Controversies, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 309 (2001).
66. Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Award and Dissenting Opinion, ¶ 80 (1993).
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To avoid such instances and ensure the application of international
law, State contracts often provide “stabilization clauses,” which aim to
make the terms of a state contract stable and fixed, not subject to
changes by legislation or other means, and thus minimizing noncommercial risks. 67 For example, in Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v.
OPIC, the tribunal concluded, despite the prohibition of State
executives to enter into agreements, under international law and the
constitutional principle of separation of powers, the State contract was
still valid and binding under public international law by virtue of a
stabilization clause. 68 Similarly, in Texaco Overseas Petroleum
Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of
the Libyan Arab Republic, 69 the Tribunal held the contracts fell within
the sphere of international law, and national regulatory measures,
including nationalization, could not nullify the contracts. 70
Despite the importance of such clauses for enhanced protection of
foreign investors from regulatory changes, such clauses are hardly, if at
all, found in sovereign debt instruments.
C. Choice of Law
From a conflict of laws perspective, not all scholars favor the view
that State contracts should be treated differently than private
commercial agreements. One such scholar, Phillip R. Wood, noted
State contracts are not governed by specific rules and, therefore, the law
of the State is not necessarily applicable. 71 In accordance with the
conflict of laws rules in most countries, in the event the contract
contains a choice of law provision, such term will be upheld.72
Indicatively, Article 1 of the International Law Institute’s Resolution,
with respect to State contracts, provides State contracts “shall be
67. Lorenzo Cotula, Stabilization Clauses and the Evolution of Environmental
Standards in Foreign Investment Contracts, 17 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 111, 120 (2006).
68. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. OPIC, AAA Award 17 I.L.M. 1321 (Aug.
24, 1978).
69. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. & California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Gov’t of the
Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978).
70. For an in-depth analysis, see A. A. Fatouros, International Law and the
Internationalized Contract, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 134 (1980).
71. See WOOD, supra note 35.
72. See 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6.
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subjected to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, failing such a
choice, to the rules of law with which the contract has the closest
link.” 73 This seems to indicate the applicable law is not based on a new
theory designed to extend the reach of international law or impose the
application of the State’s national law to contracts concluded by States,
but instead, by applying classical rules of private international law74
whereby the parties’ choice would be prevalent.
In such case, the starting point would be the will of the parties as
expressed in the terms of the contract; in other words, the choice of law
clauses are of utmost importance. Indeed, arbitral tribunals, as well as
national courts, will uphold the parties’ choice vis-a-vis applicable law,
adhering to the universally accepted principle of the “proper law of the
contract.” 75 Such choice of law clauses are upheld, regardless of the
provisions of the international private law of the State, 76 as this is
permissible under international law. 77 Therefore, the law applicable to
State contracts can be a law different than that of the national law of the
State involved. 78 This raises the question of which law can or should
be chosen by the parties.
Initially, the choice of enforcing another States’ national law
appeared as an unpopular one, due to States’ unwillingness to submit to
another State’s laws. Only 10% of Greek bonds were governed by other
national legislation (mostly English law) prior to introduction of the
Greek Bondholders’ Act. 79 This is what allowed the Greek government
to retroactively introduce CACs to sovereign bonds governed by Greek
Law, and to achieve high participation in the bond exchange. 80
73. Wautelet, supra note 37.
74. Joe Verhoeven, Droit international des contrats et droit des gens, REVUE
BELGE DE DROIT INT’L 203 (1978-79) (Fr.).
75. See Dalmia Dairy Industries v. Nat’l Bank of Pak., 1512 Int’l Chamber of
Commerce, Arbitration Tribunal ¶ 130 (1976).
76. JULIAN D.M. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: A STUDY IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARDS, OCEANA
PUBLICATIONS 96 (1978).
77. R. D. BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND COMMENTARY 259 (2005).
78. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 284
(2010).
79. Gulati & Buchheit, supra note 64, at 2.
80. See id.
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However, the Greek Bondholders Law did not affect Greek sovereign
bonds governed by foreign States. Thus, bondholders of such foreign
law bonds were able to reject the terms of the bond exchange and hold
out instead. 81 In fact, more than half of such bonds under English,
Japanese, and Swiss law were not subject to the exchange and serviced
according to their original terms. 82 Similarly, other larger economy
states within the EU, such as the UK and Germany, issue almost all
their bonds under national law. 83
This raises the question: under which circumstances will a state
accept to be subjected to a foreign state’s law? The answer can be found
by reviewing the present laws applicable to Greek sovereign bonds.
After three years, Greece re-entered the capital markets on July 25,
2017, by offering five-year sovereign bonds equal to €3 billion, all of
which were governed by English law. 84 In fact, Finland urged all EU
members experiencing financial crisis to increase the number of foreign
law bonds they would issue to remain attractive to investors in the
capital markets. 85 Similarly, States with smaller economies, where the
domestic investor base is limited (i.e. Cyprus), tend to issue foreign law
bonds to render their bonds more attractive to foreign investors who
view foreign law as a security element. 86 On the other hand, States with
an abundance of domestic investors, mainly due to national financial
stability and economic growth, tend to issue national law bonds. 87 The
prime example here is Germany. 88 This goes to show that, although
governments bonds are not negotiated, foreign investors may indirectly

81. Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy 25
(PIIE Working Paper series WP 13-8 2013).
82. M. Chamon et al., Foreign Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign
Borrowing Costs 1 (Apr. 23, 2015), https://events.barcelonagse.eu/live/files/801icf15-chamonpdf.
83. A. Clare & N. Schmidlin, The Impact of Foreign Governing Law on
European Government Bond Yields (2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2406477 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2406477.
84. See Liz Alderman, In Sign of Progress for Greece, Investors Eagerly Snap
Up New Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2017, at B7.
85. See Chamon, supra note 82.
86. Clare & Schmidlin, supra note 83.
87. Id.
88. R. W. KOLB, SOVEREIGN DEBT: FROM SAFETY TO DEFAULT 53 (2011).
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avert pressure to secure better terms for their interests, but only when
the interest from domestic investors is low. 89
To this end, currently a very large number of sovereign bonds
worldwide are issued under foreign law. Out of such bonds, New York
or English law govern the large majority (approximately 90% of the
foreign law bonds) because of an underlying choice of law provisions. 90
The choice of the applicable foreign law is important for many reasons.
Primarily, because, in all likelihood, apart from choosing a foreign law
as applicable to the bond contract, the courts of the said foreign State,
whose law was chosen, will also be selected as competent. 91 This is
largely because foreign national courts are deemed to be in a better
position to interpret and implement their own laws. 92
The competent courts are important not only for granting a
favorable judgment for investors, but also for allowing investors to
enforce such judgment. Additionally, depending on the applicable law,
bonds may or may not contain certain clauses or the interpretation of
those clauses may be different from one jurisdiction to another. 93 We
shall explore below the treatment of the “pari passu” clause under
United States and English Law.
In sum, so long as the national law of the issuing state does not
govern the contract terms, investors are somewhat safeguarded. If
foreign law governs the sovereign bonds, investors are able to resist a
forced restructuring and hold out to insist on full repayment. 94 This is
similar to the foreign law bondholders in the Greek debt restructuring.
It is for these reasons that in times of financial distress, foreign law
bonds of distressed States are often sold at a premium. 95
89. Clare & Schmidlin, supra note 83.
90. Sovereign Debt Management Forum, WORLD BANK TREASURY, 2014,
://treasury.worldbank.org/documents/BREAKOUTSESSION8final_1.pdf. See also
KOLB, supra note 89; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance,
52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997).
91. FRANCESCO PARISI, PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 493 (2017).
92. Id.
93. Darius Miller & Natalia Reisel, Do Country Level Investor Protections
Impact Security Level Contract Design? Evidence from Foreign Bond Covenants
(May
25,
2011)
(unpublished
comment),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1392990.
94. See Chamon, supra note 82.
95. Id.
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D. Lex Fori
Finally, in cases where state contracts, including sovereign bonds,
have no underlying provisions regulating the choice of law, arbitral
tribunals under ICSID, United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, and the International Chamber of Commerce adopt an
almost identical simplified approach, provided the investment treaty
contains arbitration clauses rendering one or more tribunals as
competent to adjudicate a dispute stemming from a contract. 96 In
particular, if the investment treaty does not offer guidance on the
applicable law for disputes between the host State and the investor, the
tribunals will apply lex fori (i.e. the law applicable to the relevant
tribunal). 97
In the case of Greece, contrary to the global Bilateral Investment
Treaty (“BIT”) practice, most BITs signed by Greece do not contain a
reference to ICSID, but provide for investor-State provisions that are
purely ad hoc clauses. 98 Accordingly, the Germany-Greece BIT
specifically provides for the creation of an ad hoc arbitral body
composed of three arbitrators, two of which are designated by each
contracting party, while the third will be chosen by the two pre-selected
arbitrators. 99 BIT further provides that, if it does not become possible
for the parties to choose the arbitrators, the President or the Vice
President of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) will decide. 100 In
such cases, the rules of procedure for the steps to be followed are
prescribed in the BIT text and the investors must act accordingly.

96. OLIVER DÖRR & KRISTEN SCHMALENBACH, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, SPRINGER SCIENCE & BUSINESS MEDIA 78
(2011).
97. Id.
98. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENTS
TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 129
(2012).
99. Bilateral Investment Treat, Germany-Greece, Mar. 27, 1961,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1329 (the treaty is not
mapped, however, a German version of the treaty can be found at the aforementioned
link).
100. Id.
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III. BASIC CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES
Apart from the above, applicable law is also of utmost importance
in the interpretation of contractual terms, and thus, to investors’ cases
for breach of contract. To examine bondholders’ rights in cases of
sovereign defaults, we must examine the common contractual terms
found in sovereign bond contracts that may be affected from such
default. For the purposes of this Article, the analysis is limited to the
clauses found in Greek Sovereign Bonds.
A. The “Pari Passu” Clause
Sovereign Bond Contracts will, most likely, include a “pari passu”
clause. These clauses usually state that the bonds rank pari passu,
which means there will not be any preference among bondholders and
the other unsecured obligations of the issuer. 101 Recently, in light of
recent cases, the meaning of these clauses have puzzled both academia
and practitioners. Summarily, the “pari passu” clause has been
interpreted in two ways: in a narrow sense, whereby all obligations
assumed under the bond rank will rank pari passu with all other
unsecured debt, and in a broad sense, if a debtor is unable to pay all its
obligations, such obligations will be paid on a pro-rata basis. 102
The meaning of pari passu in the context of sovereign default was
first examined in 1936, in the case of AB Obligations Interessenter v.
Bank for International Settlements (“AB Obligations”). 103 However,
pari passu clauses were introduced in sovereign bonds as early as
1871. 104 In AB Obligations, the Swiss federal court, judging under
Swiss law, had no difficulty interpreting the pari passu clause under the
broad sense, as a promise that payment to investors would be made pro-

101. Rodrigo Olivares-Camina, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt
Instruments: Developments in Recent Litigation (BIS Papers No. 72, 2013),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap72u.pdf.
102. Financial Markets Law Committee, Pari Passu Clauses, 79 F.M.L.C. 1, 2
(2005).
103. Aktiebolaget Obligations Interessenter v. Bank for Int’l Settlements, Swiss
Fed. Tribunal (1936).
104. Paolo Mauro et al., Emerging Market Spreads: Then Versus Now, 117 Q.J.
ECON. 695, 695–96 (2002).
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rata. 105 However, despite this interpretation, the Swiss court was not
willing to enforce such a finding. 106 It was for this reason that the pari
passu clauses, until recently, did not receive much attention, as they
were considered “harmless relic[s] of historical evolution.” 107 Still, the
predominant belief amongst practitioners was the clause should be
interpreted in the narrow sense.
However, Elliott Associates v. Peru 108 changed this belief by
reaffirming the Swiss Court’s judgment. There, the Court of Appeal of
Brussels, examining New York law sovereign bonds, ruled investors
could use the version of the clause, which used “payment” in relation
to pari passu to effectively claim a State is not allowed to pay certain
investors before it pays others. 109 In fact, the Court of Appeal
concluded the pari passu clause “has as a result that the debt should be
paid down equally towards all creditors in proportion to their claim.”110
To this end, the Court of Appeal granted injunctive relief to Elliot
Associates. 111 In turn, this barred Chase Manhattan and, most
importantly, Euroclear from making interest payment on Peru’s Brady
bonds to European bondholders, as Elliot Associates had a right of pro
rate payment. 112 Faced with a potential new default on its restructured
Brady Bonds, Peru entered into an agreement and paid Elliott
Associates in full. 113

105. Anna Gelpern, Courts and Sovereigns in the Pari Passu Goldmines, 7 CAP.
MKTS. L.J. 2 (2016).
106. Id. at 3.
107. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 46 (2013).
108. Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeals], Brussels, 8 ch., 2000, Elliott
Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru (2000) [hereinafter Elliot Associates, L.P.].
109. The wording of the 1983 sovereign bond contract provided, “The
obligations of the Guarantor hereunder do rank and will rank at least pari passu in
priority of payment with all other External Indebtedness of the Guarantor, and interest
thereon.” Declaration of Professor A. F. Lowenfeld, ‘Il’ll I, 8, Elliott Assocs., L.P. v.
Banco de la Nacion (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
110. Elliott Assocs., L.P., supra note 109, ¶ 6.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott
Case: A Brilliant Strategy but an Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome?, 40 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 44 (2011).
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Similarly, the District Courts of New York were asked to examine
the meaning of the pari passu clause in the context of the recent
Argentine sovereign default concerning bonds of over $100 billion.114
The case, brought by NML Capital, an affiliate of Elliot Associates,
dealt with sovereign issued bonds under a Fiscal Agency Agreement.
Argentina was unable to fully repay the nominal value and interest of
such bonds, amounting to approximately $1.33 billion. 115 Accordingly,
this resorted two offers to exchange bonds, whereby investors that held
bonds under the Fiscal Agency Agreement could exchange their
existing bonds for new, unsubordinated, and unsecured debt
instruments of lesser value reduced at approximately a quarter of the
original value. 116
To ensure the success of such bond exchanges, Argentina passed a
law restricting payment to bonds that did not participate in the
exchange. 117 NML Capital argued this was breaching the pari passu
obligations of Argentina under the sovereign bond contracts. 118 The
pari passu clause examined by the New York courts was two-pronged.
The first prong related to the securities themselves, while the second
prong related to the payment obligations of the Republic under the
Securities. 119 The District Court looking at the language of the clause,
in line with United States standard legal principles of contract
interpretation, noted the second prong of the clause meant Argentina
was prohibited from making any payments on other bonds, unless

114. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Argentina’s
‘Vulture Fund’ Crisis Threatens Profound Consequences for International Financial
System
(June
24,
2014),
http://unctad.org/en/pages/
newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=783.
115. Ricardo W. Beller & Agustina Ranieri, The PariPassu Clause As Applied
In Argentina Sovereign Bonds Litigation, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Mar. 2013),
https://www.financierworldwide.com/the-pari-passu-clause-as-applied-in-argentinasovereign-bonds-litigation/#.WcQFVbJJbIU.
116. Id.
117. Phillip Wood, The Pari Passu Clause and the Argentine Case, ALLEN &
OVERY (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/
The%20pari%20passu%20clause%20and%20the%20Argentine%20case.pdf.
118. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Restructuring Sovereign Debt After
NML v. Argentina, 12 CAP. MRKT. L. J. 224, 225 (2017).
119. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 259 (2d Cir.
2012).
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payments were made also on the defaulted FAA bonds. 120 As such, the
Court concluded Argentina breached the pari passu clause. 121 To reach
such conclusion, the District Court relied solely on the wording of the
clause and did not make any reference to previous case law. 122 The
results of this judgment were monumental for Argentina, because
Argentina was essentially barred from issuing new bonds or servicing
its restructured debt instruments. 123
Notably, the outcome of the above cases might have been different,
had these been examined under English law. Indeed, the Financial
Markets Law Committee issued a report on the role and meaning of pari
passu clauses under English law. 124 The report was triggered after
Elliott Associates v. Peru was decided, and the Committee noted, apart
from the literal interpretation of the wording of the clause, the
consequences of each interpretation should also be considered. 125 To
this end, the Committee noted that as “a matter of English law[,] the
ranking (narrow) interpretation is the proper interpretation of the pari
passu clause in sovereign debt obligations.” 126
In the context of the Greek sovereign bond restructuring, the
majority of investors could not use such clauses because, with a few
exceptions, almost all Greek-law governed bonds did not contain such
pari passu clauses. 127 Even in its newly issued English law bonds, that
contain pari passu clauses, Greece has introduced specific wording to

120. Id. at 263.
121. Id. at 265.
122. Id. at 263.
123. Bob Van Voris & Katia Porzecanski, Argentina Debt Injunction To Be
(2017),
Lifted
In
Blow
To
Hedge
Funds,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-19/argentina-bonds-judge-sayshe-will-lift-injunctions-on-debt-iku9ykz3.
124. Lord Brown-Wilkinson et al., Issue 79 – Pari Passu Clauses, Financial
Markets Law Committee (Mar. 2005), http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/2/
6/5/8/26584807/79.pdf.
125. Id. at 8.
126. Id. at 25.
127. Mitu Gulati & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Making a Voluntary Greek Debt
Exchange Work, 7 (Jan. 31, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Duke
University).
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avert the broad interpretation of such clauses. 128 Greece specifically
denounced the pro rata payment to bondholders in line with the new
pari passu model clause proposed by the International Capital Market
Association (“ICMA”). 129 The ICMA’s proposed clause aims to
exclude a pro-rata interpretation of the pari passu clause issuing explicit
language to this end. In particular, the proposed clause reads:
The Notes are the direct, unconditional and unsecured obligations of
the Issuer and rank pari passu, without preference among
themselves, with all other unsecured External Indebtedness of the
Issuer, from time to time outstanding, provided, however, that the
Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s)
at any time with respect to any such other External Indebtedness and,
in particular, shall have no obligation to pay other External
Indebtedness at the same time or as a condition of paying sums due
on the Notes and vice versa. 130

Hence, although pari passu clauses can protect some investors
(usually the holdouts), they are not always present in sovereign bonds.
Moreover, even when such clauses do exist, wording and applicable law
can diminish their broad interpretation despite the holdout’s aspirations.
A limited interpretation was required to facilitate sovereign bond
restructurings and, therefore, allow non-holdout bondholders to receive
some compensation on their bonds. 131 It also served to limit the wide
powers creditors enjoyed by holdouts under the broad interpretation of
the clause. 132 This limitation prevented creditors from holding States
hostage in a state of financial duress. 133

128. See James A Haley, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, a Coasean Perspective,
in TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: THE QUEST TO RESOLVE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES 164
(2016).
129. Id.
130. Gregory Makoff & Robert Kahn, Sovereign Bond Contract Reform
Implementing the New ICMA Pari Passu and Collective Action Clauses, 56 CIGI
PAPERS 5 (Feb. 2015).
131. William Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s Rational
Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823, 833 (2004).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 849.
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B. Collective Action Clauses
As demonstrated in the case of Argentina, holdout creditors can
have negative implications, not only for the State and its ability to issue
new bonds, but also for the entire restructuring process and, therefore,
for other bondholders. 134 To this end, an effective tool to minimize
hold-out creditors are Collective Action Clauses (“CACs”). 135
CACs take various forms, but despite their form they all aim to
resolve coordination problems between bondholders, especially in
times of bond restructuring. 136 CACs can be in the form of collective
modification clauses, which allow a qualified majority of bondholders
to decide for all bondholders, including dissenting bondholders. 137
CACs can also be in the form of acceleration clauses, whereby
bondholders can accelerate or initiate legal action against the State only
after a qualified majority of the bondholders have consented to this.138
Additionally, there are other less prominent forms of CACs, such as
representation clauses, aggregation clauses, and sharing clauses. 139
The importance of CACs was demonstrated after the peso crisis in
Mexico, where CACs were promoted as a contractual tool to facilitate
sovereign debt restructurings and eliminate the increasing cost of
adjudication. 140 A result, in 1995, the Ministers and G10 countries
formed a working group to study sovereign defaults and the problems

134. See Benu Schneider, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Road Ahead, in
LIFE AFTER DEBT: THE ORIGINS AND RESOLUTIONS OF DEBT CRISIS 199 (J. Stiglitz et
al. eds., 2014).
135. Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign
Debt, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 195, 206–11
(2008).
136. See Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the
Eurozone, 18 REV. FIN. 1, 1–2 (2013).
137. Mitu Gulati et al., A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, 54 VA.
J. INT’L L. 52, 53 (2013).
138. Id.
139. Sean Hagan, supra note 135, at 205. Collective Action Clauses in
International Sovereign Bond Contracts and Their Effect on Spreads at Issuance, 5
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with American Economic Association).
140. Sönke Haeseler, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign
Bond Contracts – Whence the Opposition?, 23 J. ECON. SURVEYS 882, 882–84 (2007).
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faced in the aforementioned context. 141 The Group issued its report in
1996 and noted that introducing CACs into sovereign bond contracts
might prove beneficial in smoothing negotiations during sovereign debt
crises. 142 However, despite the Group’s recommendation, States met
CACs with hesitation, and CACs were entirely absent in bonds issued
under local law. 143 Indicatively, before January 2013, the vast majority
of sovereign bond contacts issued by Eurozone members were
governed by each State’s national law and did not contain CACs. 144
Greece was not an exception to this rule. As indicated above,
before the adoption of the Greek Bondholders’ Law, No. 4050/2012,
the Greek sovereign bonds contained no collective action clauses, and
instead, Greece unilaterally introduced such clauses retroactively by the
Greek Bondholders’ Law. The revision of the Treaty Establishing the
European Stability Mechanism was led in part by the unilateral
modification of Eurozone sovereign bonds’ terms as a result of the
issuing state’s legislative intervention. 145 The treaty provides the model
CAC, developed by a sub-committee of the Economic and Financial
Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, would be mandatorily
included in all Eurozone sovereign bonds with a maturity of greater than
one year issued as of January 1, 2013. 146 According to Gelpern and
Gulati, this revision was enacted for two main reasons. 147 First, the
bonds needed to inspire security to investors that such unilateral acts,
as that of the Greek Government, would not take place again in the
141. John Drage & Catherine Hovaguimian, Collective Action Clauses (CACS):
An Analysis of Provisions Included in Recent Sovereign Bond Issues, BANK OF ENGL.
1 (2004), www.finanzaonline.com/forum/attachments/ obbligazioni-titoli-distato/1986399d1414067331-venezuela-2027-us922646as37-vol-27-il-ritorno-dagliinferi-cac.pdf.
142. Id.
143. Christian Hofmann, Sovereign-Debt Restructuring in Europe Under the
New Model Collective Action Clauses, 49 TEX. INT’L. L. J. 383, 390 (2014).
144. Elena Carletti et al., The Price of Law: The Case of the Eurozone Collective
Action Clauses, 3 (July 5, 2017) (unpublished comment) (on file with Duke
University).
145. Collective Action Clauses In Euro Area, ECON. & FIN. COMM.,
https://europa.eu/efc/collective-action-clauses-euro-area_en (last updated May 23,
2018).
146. Id.
147. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, The Wonder-Clause, 41 J. COMP. L. 367
(2013).
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future and bondholders could rely on the terms of the sovereign bond
contracts. 148 Second, CACs have the ability to reduce bailouts because
defaulting states would have the ability to restructure their debts. 149
Similarly, in 2014 the International Monetary Fund and ICMA both
stressed the importance of CAC in facilitating the restructuring
processes and, to this end, suggested the reformation of sovereign bond
contacts. 150 In fact, ICMA published proposed terms for aggregated
CACs, which was revised again in May 2015. 151
Now, we will briefly review the model CAC introduced in
sovereign bonds in the Eurozone and shall explore if this can facilitate
future investors’ rights. Primarily, the model CAC is mandatorily
applicable to bonds issued both internationally and domestically,
regardless if offered in the stock market or privately, and it can refer to
a single bond or series of bonds. 152 The model CAC sets a series of
processes that need to be followed before adopting a binding
modification on all bondholders. 153
The model CAC distinguishes between reserved matters, pertaining
to the most crucial bond terms, such as the payment date, interest rate,
and non-reserved matters that relate to less crucial bond terms. 154
Regarding amendments of a reserved matter, a meeting of bondholders
should be duly convened, in which bondholders holding at least 75% of
the aggregate principal amount of outstanding bonds should vote in
favor of the amendment. 155 The percentage drops to 66.66% of the
aggregate principal amount of outstanding bonds in cases of written

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Stefanescu, supra note 31, at 14.
CAP.
MKT.
ASS’N,
151. Sovereign
Debt
Information,
INT’L
https://www.icmagroup.org/resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information (last visited May
22, 2018).
152. Mairéad N. Dhonncha, EU Publishes Mandatory Collective Action Clause
for Use in Eurozone Sovereign Bonds from 1 January 2013, LINKLATERS (May 2012),
https://www.investireoggi.it/forums/attachments/clientmemo-pdf.245501/.
153. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 136.
154. EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, Model Collective
Action Clause Supplemental Explanatory Note, EUROPA 2 (Mar. 26, 2012),
https://europa.eu/efc/sites/efc/files/supplemental_explanatory_note_on_the_model_c
ac_-_26_march_2012.pdf.
155. Id.
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resolutions. 156 On the contrary, an amendment of a non-reserved matter
can be achieved by the positive vote of bondholders holding more than
50% of the aggregate principal amount of outstanding bonds present.
This can be done either at a duly convened meeting or in the form of
written resolution. 157 The model CAC also provides rules for the
conveyance of the bondholders’ meetings as well as the procedure to be
followed during the meeting.
As explained above, the introduction of CACs in sovereign bonds
is a step in the right direction for both defaulting States and
bondholders.
However, CACs primarily protect bondholders.
Significantly, the latter can now facilitate debt restructuring
negotiations, take binding decisions on issues that have a crucial
bearing on the restructuring process, and reduce the threat of holdouts
that may lead to the inability of all other bondholders to collect, even
partially. 158 Indeed, even in the Greek debt restructuring, without the
introduction of CACs, the restructuring of the sovereign debt might not
have been possible. 159 This could have led to Greece’s unregulated
default.
Although the Greek debt restructuring CACs allowed the
successful completion of the restructuring, the bondholders sustained
significant losses, which raises the question of whether there is a
contractual term that may address such losses. To this end, we shall
explore the use of “Events of Default” clauses in such cases.
C. Events of Default
The “Events of Default” clause is particularly important to
bondholders, because it allows them to accelerate the maturity of their
bonds and take enforcement measures over the issuer’s assets in

156. Id.
157. Common Terms Of Reference, ECON. & FIN. COMM. (Feb. 17, 2012),
https://europa.eu/efc/sites/efc/files/docs/pages/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf.
158. J.F. Hornbeck, Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with
Holdouts, Congressional Research Service CONG. RES. SERV. (Feb. 6, 2013),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41029.pdf.
159. Antonia E. Stolper & Sean Dougherty, Collective Action Clauses: How the
Argentina Litigation Changed the Sovereign Debt Markets, 12 CAP. MKT. L.J. 239
(2017).
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satisfaction of their claims. 160 In other words, bondholders may initiate
proceedings against the issuing state to recover the nominal value of the
bond plus interest only when an event of default occurs. When a default
occurs, bondholders would be able to accelerate all amounts owed
under the sovereign bond contract. Notably, however, bondholders
rarely choose such acceleration as a result of an event of default.
Instead, in most cases, bondholders will refer to an event of default to
improve their bargaining power, however small that power may be. 161
Although bondholders have the right to accerelate and remove the
issuing state’s assets in default, they may not simply select this right.162
Instead, they often enter into negotiations with the issuing state
regarding modifying the contract terms, without forefeiting their right
to accerelate and enforce their claims. 163
As to what constitutes a default will depend on the wording of each
sovereign bond contract. There are two broad types of defaults. The
first includes instances of non-payment of amounts due. 164 The second
refers to certain events of anticipatory non-payment. 165 Indicatively,
the majority of Greek sovereign bonds prior to the 2012 restructuring
would include the following definition of an event of default:
• failure to pay interest or principal (usually after a 30-day
grace period);
• failure or other covenant obligation (usually a grace period
is granted, and notice of default is required);
• a government order or presidential decree is issued
preventing Greece from performing its obligations under
the bonds; or

160. Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus
Corporate Debt, 75 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 999 (2007).
161. Phillip Wood, How protective are Ukraine’s international bonds?, ALLEN
&
OVERY
8
(Mar.
5,
2014),
http://www.allenovery.com/
SiteCollectionDocuments/GLIU_-_Ukraine_international_bonds_(Mar_2014).pdf.
162. YAN LIU, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bonds
(IMF Design and Effectiveness of Collective Action Clauses, 2002).
163. Id.
164. VINOD AGARWAL, Negotiating and Drafting Clauses in Loan Agreements:
Events of Default 5 (U.N. Inst. for Training & Res., 2001).
165. Id.
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•

a General Moratorium is declared on non-payment of
principal. 166
Therefore, the question that arises is when the sovereign bond
restructuring may constitute a default. Notably, although the two terms
intertwine, they are not identical. Generally, an event of default will
precede a sovereign restructuring. 167 Indeed, when an event of default
is directly linked to non-payment after the grace period has expired, a
restructuring is required. 168 However, in the case of the Greek
sovereign bond restructuring of 2012, there was no missed payment on
the side of Greece vis-a-vis bondholders. 169 However, what is of
interest is whether the unilateral introduction of CACs can prevent
Greece from performing its obligations under the bonds. 170
A similar issue was addressed by the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (“ISDA”), which examined whether the
unilateral introduction of CACs, by the Bondholders’ Law, was a
“credit event” in the context of marketed credit default swaps (“CDS”).
Although credit events are not limited to the types of defaults listed
above, it is important to review how ISDA treated the Greek sovereign
bond restructuring. Primarily, ISDA took the view that given the
voluntary nature of the bond exchange, the latter did not constitute a
credit event. 171 According to ISDA, if the bond restructuring is
voluntary, no credit event takes place. 172 This reasoning does not stem
from the CDS definitions, which make no distinction between voluntary
and involuntary events. Rather, this argument derives from the
purposive interpretation of restructuring, which intends to refer to an
event binding on all bondholders, even those dissenting to it. 173 On
these grounds, ISDA ruled the Greek restructuring of 2011 was not
166. See, e.g., Hellenic Republic, OFFERING CIRCULAR (Feb. 21, 2005),
http://s3cdn.observador.pt/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/greece-ecb-bond1.pdf.
167. Das, supra note 61.
168. AGARWAL, supra note 164.
169. Agustino Fontevecchia, ISDA Says Greece in Default, CDS Will Trigger,
FORBES (Mar. 9, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/ 2012/03/09/ongreece-defaults-and-the-future-of-derivatives/#15e8e3ae69fd.
170. See Greek Sovereign Debt Q&A (Update), ISDA (July 25, 2011),
http://www2.isda.org/news/greek-sovereign-debt-qampa-update.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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likely to entail payments under CDS contracts. 174 On the contrary, in
2012, ISDA concluded the introduction of CACs by Greece unilaterally
amending the terms of Greek law governed bonds constituted a
Restructuring Credit Event. 175 Thus, the CACs rendered the sovereign
bond restructuring binding on all bondholders of Greek-law governed
bonds, even those that dissent. 176
Despite this determination within the CDS context, contractually,
it is unlikely the unilateral introduction of CACs could constitute a
default and, therefore, be in a position to award bondholders an
additional card on the restructuring negotiation table. Indeed, given the
nature of CACs clauses, these do not constitute a change in the bond’s
payment terms, nor did they prevent Greece from performing its
obligations under the bonds. Instead, it appears in the context of the
Greek sovereign debt restructuring, the introduction of CACs was used
to avert an event of default by Greece.
D. Other Clauses
Other clauses that can usually be found in sovereign bonds include
clauses such as “negative pledge clauses” 177 that prohibit the issuance
of new collateralized debt, unless existing debt is enhanced in the same
way. Additionally, “secured debt clauses” 178 and “cross default
clauses” 179 define a default event as a State’s default on another
government bond.
Prior to the Greek sovereign debt restructuring of 2012, Greek
Bonds did not provide any security or other guarantees for the

174. Id.
175. ISDA EMEA Determinations Committee: Restructuring Credit Event Has
Occurred with Respect to the Hellenic Republic (Mar. 9, 2012),
https://www.isda.org/2012/03/09/isda-emea-determinations-committeerestructuring-credit-event-has-occurred-with-respect-to-the-hellenic-republic/.
176. Id.
177. MAURO MEGLIANI, SOVEREIGN DEBT: GENESIS - RESTRUCTURING –
LITIGATION 179 (2014).
178. FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS
AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 62 (2006).
179. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Eric. A. Posner, The Evolution of
Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 139 (2012).
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satisfaction of creditors in case of default. 180 In addition, they did not
entail negative pledge clauses protecting the bondholders who took out
an unsecured loan. 181 Negative pledge clauses provide a State that has
awarded unsecured loans, cannot subsequently take out other loan(s)
with a different lender, securing the subsequent loan(s) by the same
specified assets. 182 Use of the same assets as collateral would mean that
the original lender would be disadvantaged because the subsequent
lender may have a priority position to satisfy his claim by the assets in
an event of default.
Following the restructuring, however, this has changed. Indeed, the
bonds that were offered to bondholders at the time of the restructuring
contained negative pledge clauses, preventing Greece from issuing any
secured bonds for as long as any of the restructured bonds remained
outstanding. 183 Interestingly, in the bonds issued during the 2012 Greek
bond exchange, a wider definition of a default event was adopted,
including any failure by the issuing state to comply with any of the
covenants contained in the new bonds, subject to a thirty-day cure
period. 184 Hence, a violation of the negative pledge clause would,
under the new exchanged bonds, also constitute an event of default.
Thus, such clause may be a useful tool for investors’ protection in
case of future default, but such clauses are not relevant for investors’
rights prior to the 2012 restructuring.
E. Waiver of Immunity Clauses
One of the most important clauses for bondholders’ protection is
the clause that specifically waives an issuing state’s immunity for
jurisdiction and enforcement. 185 Enforcement is the motive for
investors to pursue their claims against the Host State. 186 Although it
is a result of the judicial process, enforcement against States is neither
180. See Zettelmeyer, supra note 82; see also K. A. LAVDAS ET AL., STATENESS
AND SOVEREIGN DEBT: GREECE IN THE EUROPEAN CONUNDRUM 125 (2013).
181. LAVDAS, supra note 180, at 125.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 179, at 139.
186. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment
Law, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 155 (2007).
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easy nor common. Indeed, up to the mid-twentieth century, courts and
scholars treated claims under sovereign bonds as unenforceable. 187
Accordingly, in the English case of Twycross v. Dreyfus, 188 Sir George
Jessel noted sovereign bonds are only “engagements of honour” and not
enforceable contractual obligations as no tribunal would enforce them
absent the consent of the issuing state. 189 Historically, States used to
enjoy absolute immunity; however, since the late twentieth century,
there has been a shift from States’ absolute immunity to relative
immunity. 190
Here, we must distinguish between immunity from jurisdiction and
immunity from enforcement. The former provides that the national
courts of a foreign state do not have jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit against
another state, unless the latter has so consented. 191 On the other hand,
immunity from enforcement restricts the powers of national courts or
other organs of the state against the property of another state found in
its jurisdiction. 192 Absolute immunity provided States with immunity
from foreign jurisdiction and enforcement, 193 while relative immunity
provides that when a sovereign chooses to enter the international
marketplace and act as a commercial actor, it cannot escape liability
through invoking sovereign immunity, but instead shall be similarly
accountable to the judicial process similar to other commercial
actors. 194
The Courts of Germany, in the context of the Greek Sovereign
Bond Exchange, recently examined the issue of immunity from

187. CHRISTIAN TIETJE, THE RULE OF LAW IN MONETARY AFFAIRS: TAKING
STOCK 14 (Thomas Cottier et al., eds., 2014).
188. Twycross v. Dreyfus (1877) 5 Ch D at 605 (Eng.).
189. Id.
190. W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt and the
“Contracts Matter” Hypothesis, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
(forthcoming).
191. August Reinisch, European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity
from Enforcement Measures, 17 EUR. J. INT. LAW 803, 806 (2006).
192. Id. at 803.
193. Id. at 804.
194. Lee Buchheit, Sovereign Debt Restructurings: The Legal Context 107 (BIS
Papers No. 72, 2013).
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jurisdiction. 195 Several German bondholders that acquired Greek
sovereign bonds from German Banks in Germany resorted to German
Courts to enforce actions against Greece claiming damages for the
unilateral introduction of CACs in their bonds that led to them
sustaining a haircut on their bonds. 196 Bondholders’ claims were raised
on two bases. First, a claim, based on tort, asserted the bond exchange
was a wrongful exchange. 197 Second, bondholders raised claims for
breach of contract. 198 In all cases, German Courts examined whether
they were barred from hearing any claims against the Greek state by
virtue of sovereign immunity.
Per German law, sovereign immunity does not apply to a State’s
commercial acts; in other words, immunity will only apply when a State
is acting as sovereign. 199 Hence, the German courts examined whether
bondholders’ claims related to sovereign or commercial acts. 200 Based
on this, the Federal Court of Justice concluded that claims in tort were
inadmissible. 201 The Greek Bondholders Law and the Council of
Ministers’ subsequent decision to ratify the majority vote and extend its
binding result on all bondholders were acts taken by Greece as a
sovereign and, therefore, sovereign immunity applied. 202 However, the
Court noted this was not necessarily the case for claims brought for
breach of contract. 203
Indeed, when German Courts examined bondholders’ claims for
breach of contract, two Higher Regional Courts in Oldenburg and
Cologne noted that no sovereign immunity was applicable as the claims
stemmed from a contractual relation and the Greek Bondholders’ Law

195. See Sebastian Grund, The Legal Consequences of Sovereign Insolvency –
A Review of Creditor Litigation in Germany Following the Greek Debt Restructuring,
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. (forthcoming).
196. Id. at 18–21.
197. Id. at 25.
198. Id. at 43.
199. HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 223–30 (2d
ed. 2008).
200. See Grund, supra note 195, at 13.
201. Id. at 28.
202. Richard M. Buxbaum, Sovereign Debtors Before Greece: The Case of
Germany, 65 KAN. L.R. 101, 101–03 (2017).
203. Id. at 122.
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could not change this. 204 However, the Schleswig Higher Regional
Court contested that the significant point was not the non-payments by
the Greek State, but the introduction of the Bondholders’ Law, which
was in fact a sovereign act. 205 As per the Schleswig Court, the issue in
question was whether the introduction of CACs by the Bondholders’
Law was legal, and whether examining the legality of foreign
legislative acts was within the scope of immunity. 206 In all cases,
however, German Courts did not proceed to examine the merits of the
case, as even the Courts in Cologne and Oldenburg dismissed
bondholders’ claims as the Courts did not have jurisdiction under the
old Brussels Regulation (EC) 44/2001. 207
The scope and extent of State Immunity regarding enforcement is
far more disputed than jurisdictional immunity, and there is no uniform
global practice. Different States have adopted different approaches,
and the practice of national Courts in Europe is anything but uniform in
this field. 208 Nevertheless, some common elements have emerged as
most States have abandoned the notion of absolute sovereign immunity
against enforcement and have adopted a more limited application of the
aforementioned relative immunity doctrine.
Specifically, one of the most decisive factors to determine the
extent of immunity from enforcement is the prevailing purpose of the
property against which enforcement measures are sought. 209 Indeed, in
the Philippine Embassy Bank Account Case, the German Constitutional
Court stated that:

204. Id.
205. Wolf Bussian & Jan Erik Windthrost, Germany: German Courts Dismiss
Greek Government Bondholders’ Claims Against Greece on State Immunity or
Jurisdiction Grounds, ALLEN & OVERY, http://www.allenovery.com/ publications/engb/lrrfs/continental%20europe/Pages/German-courts-dismiss-Greek-governmentbondholders-claims-against-Greece-on-state-immunity-or-jurisdiction-grounds.aspx
(last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
206. Id.
207. Sebastian Grund, Enforcing Sovereign Debt in Court – A Comparative
Analysis of Litigation and Arbitration Following the Greek Debt Restructuring of
2012, 1 U. VIENNA L. REV. 34, 34–90 (2017).
208. See Reinisch, supra note 193.
209. Leo J. Bouchez, The Nature and Scope of State Immunity from Jurisdiction
and Execution, 10 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 17 (1979).
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There is a general rule of international law that execution by the State
having jurisdiction on the basis of a judicial writ of execution against
a foreign State, issued in relation to non-sovereign action (acta iure
gestionis) of that State upon that State’s things located or occupied
within the national territory of the State having jurisdiction, is
inadmissible without assent by the foreign State, insofar as those
things serve sovereign purposes of the foreign State at the time of
commencement of the enforcement measure. 210

As evidenced by the aforementioned decision, differences exist
between property for sovereign purposes that is immune from
execution/enforcement and property for non-sovereign/commercial
purposes that are not immune. This distinction is also found in the case
law of other European countries, such as Spain, Italy, and the
Netherlands. 211 This principal was also upheld in a Belgian judgment,
while even Swiss Courts that used to deny absolute immunity have now
accepted that, only, property used for commercial purposes may be the
object of execution. 212 France also acknowledges the distinction
between property used for sovereign purposes and property used for
private/commercial purposes; however, it requires a link between the
property against which execution is sought and the original claim is
established. 213 The link need not be proven if the property is public but
not sovereign.
Another limitation to the doctrine of immunity from enforcement
is the private law characterization of the transaction. 214 French Law
goes even further granting immunity only if the State’s act is either an
act of Government (“acte de puissance publique”) or if it is carried out
for public interest (“dansl’intérêt d’un service public”). 215 Notably,
States could easily invoke the aforementioned doctrine to avoid their
obligations stemming from arbitral awards; any action taken against

210. 46 BVERFGE 46, 342 2 BVM 1/76 “Philippine Embassy” (Ger.).
211. Reinisch, supra note 193.
212. Id.
213. VINCENT HEUZÉ & PIERRE MAYER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 323 (L.G.D.J.
ed., 2007).
214. D. Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government
Controlled Investors (OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2010/02,
2010), http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2010_2.pdf.
215. HEUZÉ & MAYER, supra note 213, at 325.
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them and, in this case against Greece, would be without any purpose.
Therefore, a State that successfully relies on State Immunity to prevent
enforcement may be in violation of its obligation under Bilateral or
Multilateral Investment Treaties, as well as European Law. 216
However, in cases of extreme financial distress, as in the case of Greece
in 2012, where imminent default and collapse of the financial system
was pending, it appears that Greece’s actions were in fact for the public
interest.
In the case of ICSID adjudication, as in the case of Argentina, it
would be a treaty violation for a Contracting State to refuse to enforce
an award. 217 It would also be non-compliant with Article 54, which
would then carry the consequences of State responsibility, including the
revival of diplomatic protection under Article 27(1) of the ICSID
Convention. 218 On account of the above, it comes as no surprise that
since ICSID’s creation, all countries, with the exception of Argentina,
have complied with their obligation to pay an arbitral award once its
determination was finalized.
To address the issue and award bondholders’ security that they
would be entitled to enforce their claims in the case of default, new
bonds contain a waiver clause for both immunity from enforcement and
judgment. Accordingly, the bond issued in 2015 provided:
13. Waiver of Immunity
(a) The Republic hereby irrevocably waives, to the extent permitted
by applicable law and international conventions;
(i) any immunity from jurisdiction it may have in any Proceeding
in the courts of England; and

216. See Michel Tison, Who’s Afraid of Peter Paul? The European Court of
Justice to Rule on Banking Supervisory Liability, THE FIN. REG. (Dec. 2004),
http://www.law.ugent.be/fli/wps/pdf/WP2004-11.pdf (although in such instance it
was found that invoking state immunity was not a violation of German Constitutional
and EU law).
217. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 53, Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
218. See Stanimir Alexandrov, Enforcement of ICSID Awards: Articles 53 and
54 of the ICSID Convention, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 322, 326 (Christina Binder
et al., eds., 2009).
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(ii) except as provided below, any immunity from attachment or
execution to which its assets or property might otherwise be entitled in
any Proceeding in the courts of England, and agrees that it will not
claim any such immunity in any such Proceeding.
(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the above waiver shall not
constitute a waiver of immunity from attachment or execution with
respect to:
i. assets and property of the Republic located in the Republic;
ii. the premises and property of the Republic’s diplomatic and
consular missions;
iii. assets and property of the Republic outside the Republic not
used or intended to be used for a commercial purpose;
iv. assets and property of the Republic’s central bank or monetary
authority;
v. assets and property of a military character or under the control of
a military authority or defense agency of the Republic; or
vi. assets and property forming part of the cultural heritage of the
Republic.
(c) For the purposes of the foregoing, “property” includes, without
limitation, accounts, bank deposits, cash, revenues, securities and
rights, including rights against third parties.
(d) The foregoing constitutes a limited and specific waiver by the
Republic solely for the purposes of the Notes, and under no
circumstance shall it be construed as a general waiver by the Republic
or a waiver with respect to proceedings unrelated to the Notes. 219
Thus, immunity waiver clauses are important tools in the protection
of sovereign bondholders in case of sovereign default, although
insufficient on their own. Moreover, although the vast majority of
sovereign bonds currently contain these immunity waiver clauses, as
pointed out by Professor Weidemaier, it has not “played much of a role
in the broader drama of sovereign debt.” 220
CONCLUSION
Sovereign bonds, despite their particular nature of being contracts
with the sovereign, nonetheless continue to be contracts. To this end,

219. Hellenic Republic, supra note 166.
220. Weidemaier, supra note 4, at 112.
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the terms included in such contracts are of importance, especially in
cases of sovereign debt restructuring or sovereign default. Recent
caselaw on sovereign defaults have illustrated this importance.
Although, undoubtedly in some cases, a default event will occur and
political concerns will also come into play, contractual terms are still
important. Perhaps, the most important clause in a sovereign bond
contract is the choice of law, as it has wide ramifications on the entire
interpretation of the sovereign bond contract. Traditionally, states used
to “impose” their own national law, as this granted them power to
control their debt. Indeed, in cases where the governing law of a
sovereign bond contract is that of the issuing state, then the latter retains
the power to change that law to its favour.
This is what happened during the Greek Sovereign Debt
Restructuring in 2012, when Greece adopted the Bondholder’s Law,
unilaterally amending the terms of the sovereign bonds’ contracts by
the introduction of CACs that made the bondholder majority’s
resolution for restructuring binding even on dissenting bondholders.
Prior to 2012, Greek bonds were issues under Greek law and contained
no standard creditor protection clauses, such as pari passu, secured
debt, CAS, negative pledge or immunity waiver clauses.
However, since 2012, there has been a significant change in the
terms of sovereign bonds issued by the Greek Government. New bonds
are issued under English law and contain pari passu, negative pledges,
and immunity waiver clauses. Moreover, responding to the Greek
unilateral amendment of the sovereign bond contract’s terms in 2012,
the Eurozone has requested that all Euro-denominated sovereign bonds
contain CACs. This reformation of contractual terms was brought
about to restore investors’ faith in Greek bonds and demonstrate the
importance and power of contractual terms.
Although holders of Greek sovereign bonds have not been
successful in claiming damages due to the Greek Bond Restructuring of
2012, recent changes to bond terms strongly reinforced their positions.
In the unfortunate event of a new sovereign bond restructuring or a
future sovereign default, investor’s rights will be better protected from
negotiation to actual contract enforcement.
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